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Presidents And Conflict Resolution Essay, Research Paper

Patrick McShan

HIS 3360

November 19, 1999

Presidents and Conflict Resolution

The term negotiation has been defined as a formal process that occurs when parties are trying to find a mutually acceptable solution to a complex conflict. People and parties, throughout time, have come to negotiate for two basic reasons. First, they negotiate to create something new that neither party could do on his own. Second, parties negotiate to resolve a problem or dispute between the parties. Although history lends itself to be more susceptible to the latter of the two, the former reason should and will be given some consideration. American history has encountered countless arenas for negotiation. From the founding of new constitutions and governments to the ending of world wars, America has had to compromise repeatedly to establish itself as a superpower. At the top of this bargaining hierarchy is the President of the United States. The actions of this office have implemented policy in all times of dispute. Different presidents have pursued this task in different ways. Some have elected bodies of peace commissioners in which they could voice their opinions through. On the other hand, a few presidents have acted strictly on their own behalf concerning times of dispute. Consequently, the results have varied. So, it must be asked, what method has proven to be most effective? An analysis of several major American wars and their respective peacetime results supports the view that those who elect negotiating bodies and communicate through them have been more effective in achieving their goals.

The first war to be looked at is referred to as Mr. Madison’s war, or the War of 1812. Before the war commenced, James Madison wanted to end impressment, gain Canada, and secure the repeal of the Orders-in-Council. In June of 1812, Britain repealed the Orders-in-Council thereby accomplishing half of Madison’s war aims with no shots yet fired. But, as shots began firing, America’s position was dwindling. By this time, with one attempt to invade Canada having ended in total defeat and another mired in the great swamps of northwestern Ohio, the United States was pathetically anxious to talk peace. The Tsar Alexander of Russia offered to mediate but Madison acted before he even knew of Britain’s answer to this offer. He appointed his Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin and Federalist James Bayard to go to St. Petersburg to negotiate peace. John Quincy Adams, U.S. Minister to Russia, was to meet them there and aid in the talks. Henry Clay and Jonathan Russell were added to the list once Britain agreed to bargain directly. Furthermore, this team of five was sent abroad with orders to come to peaceful terms with Britain. Once Gallatin and Bayard reached England, Gallatin communicated effectively with Madison. He advised Madison and his government not to insist on the impressment issue. Only Gallatin and Bayard were fully aware of the atmosphere in Britain following the fall of Napoleon. Madison simply had to rely on their judgement. Gallatin knew that dropping the issue would force Britain to talk peace eventually. Therefore, Madison altered his original stance in order to seek peace without any stipulations on impressment. Now the peace commissioners had instructions and could proceed with the discussions. Because these men could notify their government and wait for responses, they were given time to develop future strategies and act as mere messengers when, in fact, they had vast bargaining power. It is said that the British commission was inferior to the American both in its clarity of its instructions and in the ability of its members. Madison’s decision to delegate this negotiating authority to competent men allowed the U.S. and Britain to come to a rather quick peace. Adams, Gallatin, and the others were able to communicate with Madison and then with the British officials. They could, in a sense, feel the British out and then report back. No decisions had to be made hastily that would result in immediate policy. The procedure followed by Madison was effective and should have set a clear precedent for future peace negotiations.

The next war to be examined is the Mexican-American War that took place during the presidency of James K. Polk. The war had reached the heart of Mexico and Polk was beginning to think in terms of peace. After much deliberation concerning whom was to be the peace commissioner, Polk, on Buchanan’s recommendation, decided on chief clerk of the Department of State Nicholas Trist. Trist was an able man, perfectly familiar with the Spanish character and language. Well-defined instructions had been given to Trist concerning the desired boundaries and what the U.S. was willing to pay for them. His mission was to be kept secret because Polk did not want the Whigs to try and sabotage these negotiations. One line of communication that was a major part in Trist’s venture dealt with General Winfield Scott. Because of their great pride, strong independence, and extreme sensitivity both men instantly disliked one another. But, the two became friends and worked together to defeat the Mexican army and negotiate a peace treaty. The treaty drawn up by the Secretary of State was presented to the Mexican government by Trist. After review, it was denied. This gave impetus to the U.S. army’s assault on Mexico City. Polk had trouble keeping up with Trist’s progress. He was unsure of the successes on the battlefields and in the peace rooms. On several occasions, Polk said, I fear he may greatly embarrass the government. In fact, Polk lost so much faith that he recalled Trist on several occasions. Obviously, these demands were ignored because Trist felt he was making some progress with Mexican officials, especially since the victory in Mexico City. It must be mentioned that

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