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Decision Making Essay, Research Paper

Decision Making

More than thirty years have passed since the dramatic cling of arm in the remote Himalayan region of the Sino-Indian border. This Time gap seems to be appropriate for a correct reexamination of the conflict. The account of India’s attempt to find balance with China, ever since the Kongska Pass incident in 1959 until the attack of 1962, is not merely a fact sheet that we can brows and toss away. In stead we have to link each idea to the event and causes that might have played a role in the conflict.

Ever since 1959 the border problem between Asia’s biggest two nation states has been picking up speed at a threatening speed. The year 1962 was the unfortunate year for India, which knocked out any possibility of understanding between China and India. Of course, such an act of terror could have not started without some kind of the reason, whatever it may be. The chronological order of

pre-crisis decisions taken India’s authorities are that the latter helped Nehru convey his thought and policies to the outside world in a forceful and organized manner (Brecher, 1959). But as Rajani Palme Dutt said in his book “The problem of India,” foreign policy was exercised “more behind the scenes than in meetings of the committee.” Both Menon and Nehru acted to the desire of Nehru. It was often when the Foreign secretary would take to Pant drafts of diplomatic correspondence and get the reaction which was usually at Nehru’s request (Hoffmann, 1990).

Foreign policy makers Nehru, Menon and Pant shared a common worldview which clearly showed their psychological predisposition, drawn from the sources of their personality, idiosyncrasy, ideology, tradition, culture and history. As we shall see further down, in the mainstream of common ideas and beliefs, they indeed had some differences. But all these men used the “attitudinal prism” (Hoffmann, 1990), the lens through which they filtered and structured the information thus perceiving the world. One set of Indian beliefs referred to the role India should play world. This role was supposed to reflect the fact that India was a considerably new nation-state.

India also had to preserve her independence of action. It didn’t simply fight for independence simply to become a camp follower of any of the Cold War

Power blocs. The restrictions and limitations that such a position implies would be against India’s national interest. And it was exactly this nonalignment policy of Nehru between the two sides of the Cold War, which was the projection of Indian nationalism into world affairs (Maxwell, 1970). Nehru also expressed the idea that India was an Asian power that should not be overlooked at. He demonstrated that “in regard to any major problem of a country or a group of countries of Asia, India has to be considered” (Gopal, 1980).

During the 1950’s and 1960’s Nehru and his advisors realized that India was playing a far more than neutral role in the Cold War politics. She was a very important player on the world stage, where questions of war and peace were decided. He recognized that in s bipolar world, in which relations between the superpowers were based mainly on “balance-of-power calculations” (Hoffmann, 1990), a nuclear holocaust, for example, had become highly likely. He sought that India should stay out of the superpowers’ way in the nuclear arms race and at the same time work to the reduction of superpower confrontation by “fostering communication, engaging in constructive diplomacy and public judging each action of the United States and the former Soviet Union on its merits” (Brecher, 1959). Nehru strongly believed that this trend will only act to the good of India, for it was “economic development that was the countries primary goal” (Hoffmann, 1990). So the act of nonalignment was an act of peace and not hostility. A nonalignment trend will also allow India to receive development aid from “as many countries as could be persuaded to contribute” (Hoffmann, 1990). India’s prime minister was well aware that at the present state the country could not spent considerable amount of resources for a large defense establishment. An India aligned with no Cold War Power bloc would help avoid alienating nations like former Soviet Union and China, which were of great importance to India’s security. Nehru himself realized that a hostile frontier with China, for example, would mean an expenditure of all Indian resources just to defend it (Gopal, 1980).

Another standard belief that Nehru and the rest of his associates developed in India’s foreign policy affairs was the so called image making (Hoffmann, 1990). Nehru developed the complex “images” of nations, governments, international trends and situations. Of course, as later will be shown, they were subject to change, but not that easily. So in the way of image making, Nehru had made it a fundamental view of Indian foreign policy to treat former Soviet Union and China as separate powers, passing two different sets of problems. According to Nehru, relations could be kept constructive and could be improved once the U.S. overcame their suspicion of nonalignment. Another reason for the obstruction of Indo-American relations was the U.S. policy toward arming Pakistan military, thereby threatening India military.

As the result of this momentous post independence decision of India’s authority, once again primarily Nehru and Krishna Menon, the country had accepted membership in the remains of the British Empire – the Commonwealth (Hoffmann, 1990). This important tie assured India, that despite of nonalignment it would never be completely isolated. It would be granted communication with the West and other Third World countries, members once again in the commonwealth, and as a result Indian diplomatic influence would be enhanced.

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