cent, which will not be lower than the level of increase in the number of human resources in the country. This option is more desirable for a country than the reduction of wages that in turn may be limited or impossible due to a number of regulatory procedures in the labour market. However, new investment may take place too slowly or be restrained by unfavourable investment climate in the host country, which may, in turn, still be affected as a result of the unfavourable political situation that will be created, including due to the rapid increase in the number of refugees to a country [Dadush, 2016].
As a result, the number of migrants that are refugees is not transformed into the quality of the workforce; instead they become dependent on humanitarian aid. Some displaced workers who have not gained an option of employment within a formal economy join the illegal labour market in the informal sector while working for very low wages and being the object of abuse and exploitation. In the recent decades, the majority of the refugees, mostly unskilled workers who came to the developed countries without knowing the language, in some cases arriving illegally or even having entered the host country legally, had been waiting to get a work permit for months or years. Despite having a certain professional level the refugees also face the problem of non-recognition of their skills and they have to take a lower qualification job or pass new exams that also may take years [Dadush, 2016].
The World Bank study [Ianchovichina, 2014] shows that due to the flow of Syrian refugees to Lebanon, the overall supply of labour in the country has increased from 30 to 50% majorly affecting women, youth and unskilled workers. The overall level of unemployment and the share of informal employment in total employment have risen by 10%. Another World Bank study on the welfare of Syrian refugees [Verme] has revealed that if there is a high level of refugees among forced migrants, access to the labour market is not a determining factor to overcome it, which may be due to the fact that the work of refugees is paid for at significantly lower level compared to the wages of local population.
The ILO study [Masri] on forced migration in Lebanon, where the number of refugees is more than 20% of the local population, has found that among Syrians, many of which are eligible for official employment in Lebanon, the unemployment rate is around 30%, and their average monthly salary totals USD 277 while the legally established minimum wage in the country equals USD 477. Inequality in payment for labour is especially manifested among vulnerable workers, for example, Syrian women receive only about one-third of the minimum wage. A similar ILO study on Syrian refugees in Jordan [Aljuni] indicates that wages of unskilled and semiskilled workers range from 4 to 10 Jordanian dinars, which is not sufficient to ensure adequate quality of life.
Forced migration takes place mainly within a short-term period, while it may be accompanied by significant flows of refugees contrasting with the case of voluntary migration when migration flows are more stable. Forced migration may produce a considerable demographic shock, followed by a sharp imbalance in the demand and supply of public services, the availability of places to stay in the host country [Zetter]. Expectations of business may have an additional negative impact on the economic situation in countries or regions where the investment climate is unfavourable, and the influx of foreigners could destroy the existing social and political balance [18]. This can delay or stop private investment altogether, which in turn still will increase the cost of housing and services. Tax obstacles may limit needed investments in the public sector, while under the pessimistic scenario a BOP deficit may result into a devaluation of the currency and make imports of food and fuel more expensive [Dadush, 2016].
The current ‘immigration crisis’ of the EU at present is far from that of developing countries in terms of receiving a significant flow of refugees compared with the main host countries of forced migrants, as evidenced by Table 1.
1
Ability to accept refugees by specific countries, 2014 [Dadush, 2016]
Germany | Italy | Jordan | Lebanon | |
Population(mln. people) | 80.889 | 61.336 | 6.607 | 4.547 |
GDP,USD bln. | 3853 | 301.000 | 89.000 | 10.000 |
Averagelevel of GDP growth in 2010-14, % | 1.960 | -0.520 | 2.700 | 3.020 |
GDPper capita, USD/ person | 47.633 | 34.955 | 5.449 | 10.116 |
Unemployment,% | 5.300 | 12.200 | 12.600 | 6.500 |
Numberof refugees in general, thsd | 217.000 | 94.000 | 654.000 | 1154.000 |
Inflowof refugees in 2014, thsd | 40.500 | 20.500 | 119.000 | 404.000 |
Expectedaverage annual migration (2011-15), thsd | 550.000 | 900.000 | 400.000 | 500.000 |
Ratioof refugees per 1 000 inhabitants | 2.630 | 1.530 | 87.160 | 232.390 |
number of applications for asylum in 2015 unprecedented for Germany being at around 1 million people (1.2% of the population), which by the
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